T his paper considers pricing and capacity sizing decisions, in a single-class Markovian model motivated by communication and information services. The service provider is assumed to operate a finite set of processing resources that can be shared among users; however, this shared mode of operation results in a service-rate degradation. Users, in turn, are sensitive to the delay implied by the potential degradation in service rate, and to the usage fee charged for accessing the system. We study the equilibrium behavior of such systems in the specific context of pricing and capacity sizing under revenue and social optimization objectives. Exact solutions to these problems can only be obtained via exhaustive simulations. In contrast, we pursue approximate solutions that exploit large-capacity asymptotics. Economic considerations and natural scaling relations demonstrate that the optimal operational mode for the system is close to "heavy traffic." This, in turn, supports the derivation of simple approximate solutions to economic optimization problems, via asymptotic methods that completely alleviate the need for simulation. These approximations seem to be extremely accurate. The main insights that are gleaned in the analysis follow: congestion costs are "small," the optimal price admits a two-part decomposition, and the joint capacity sizing and pricing problem decouples and admits simple analytical solutions that are asymptotically optimal. All of the above phenomena are intimately related to statistical economies of scale that are an intrinsic part of these systems.
Introduction and Overview
In recent years, there has been explosive growth in the usage of the Internet and, in particular, in the scope of services made available under the auspices of the so-called "World Wide Web" (WWW). Examples include Internet telephony, streaming audio, e-mail, and information retrieval, to name a few. In addition, many Internet visionaries foresee the future of personal computing and, in particular, of handheld appliances, as mainly providing an entry port to the WWW, with most common software beingstochastic, customers are sensitive to both price and congestion effects, and there is a finite amount of resources (processing and storage capacity) that constrains the performance of the system. In contrast with traditional models, however, typically there is no physical inventory of goods and no queueing-related phenomena in these systems; congestion effects arise from the sharing of resources by the users. Thus, delays are not the result of jobs or users waiting to receive service, rather, they arise from a rate of service that is lower than nominal. In particular, any number of users can simultaneously access the service, but when the combined demand exceeds a nominal load, the system's processing capacity gets divided among them, and the rate of service experienced by the users degrades. On the other hand, when the demand is less than the nominal load, resources cannot be "pooled" to provide better-than-nominal service to the users. Internet telephony, or bandwidth provision via cable modems are examples of physical systems that share these features. 1 Our formulation assumes that the pricing mechanism used by the service provider is a fixed "payper-access" charge, i.e., users pay a static usage fee for accessing the system. This is easy to implement, transparent to the user, and provides a good starting point for the more complex problem of dynamic pricing. Taking into account the users' sensitivity to price and service level, and capacity-related costs (initial investment, operational costs, and equipment devaluation), the service provider is faced with the problem of jointly selecting the system's capacity and a fixed pricing rule to optimize system profits (monopoly pricing) or total utility (social pricing).
This paper strives to contribute to the analysis and understanding of the above problems along three dimensions. The first dimension concerns model formulation. We propose a simple Markovian model for the dynamics of systems with finite capacity and resource sharing capabilities (queueing and inventory effects are absent in our formulation). This is 1 In many applications, there is a binding constraint on the rate at which the user can access these services (typically due to other capacity constraints, e.g., the maximum speed supporting the users' connection to the network), as well as intrinsic limitations on the extent to which resources can be pooled on the server end.
essentially an M/M/ model where the total available processing capacity shared by all busy servers is constrained and the capacity that can be dedicated to each individual user, therefore, is upper bounded. User utility depends on the fixed usage fee as well as the anticipated service degradation; these effects, in turn, are captured via a probabilistic choice model that determines user behavior and aggregate demand. An intrinsic "feedback" between congestion and demand is present (an increase in the former reduces the latter and vice versa), due to there dynamics, so we invoke an equilibrium framework that determines the system's nominal operating point. Despite the Markovian nature of the model, the intrinsic equilibrium structure renders the exact analysis of the optimization objectives essentially intractable, thus, one has to resort to approximate procedures.
The second dimension highlights the relation and connections between economic analysis, and the optimal operation of the system. We essentially show that if the demand for services is elastic, then economic optimization of the class of systems described in the previous paragraph is achieved in an operational regime where high resource utilization and positive probability of congestion are both present. One informal interpretation of this result is that "heavy traffic is economically optimal," with the understanding that this statement holds under structural and economic assumptions on the model and demand process. This observation allows us, in turn, to port analysis tools that support straightforward approximate solutions to the original economic optimization problems. Moreover, the optimal operating regime provides a simple (but, perhaps, not immediately obvious) classification of the various scaling relations that prevail in such large-capacity systems that are optimized subject to economic criteria. Most notably, users experience only minor service degradation effects in spite of the high resource utilization, which is the key driver behind the economic optimality of the heavy-traffic regime. These effects are directly related to the nominal capacity in a manner that reveals statistical economies of scale, and are similar to what has been observed in other large stochastic service systems such as call centers and communication networks.
Finally, the third dimension concerns the mode of analysis and solution methodology. As previously mentioned, economic arguments lead to the optimality of heavy traffic, which, in turn, allows us to harness some simple analytical insights from that framework. In particular, we develop a tractable approximation to the original economic optimization problems that yield analytical characterizations of the equilibrium behavior, as well as the optimal pricing and capacity decisions. Simple "rules of thumb" for both pricing and capacity sizing follow from basic scaling relations. This mode of analysis culminates in a "recipe" that involves simple numerical calculations, thus, completely circumventing the need for tedious optimization rooted on exact analysis. The latter approach is used, however, to illustrate the accuracy of the results obtained via these approximations.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The introduction concludes with a short literature review. Section 2 presents the model and formulates the optimal pricing problem. Section 3 reviews some machinery, and analyzes the behavior of large-capacity systems with shared resources. Section 4 studies the pricing problem under a revenue maximization objective, and §5 extends the analysis to the problem of jointly optimizing over system capacity and price. Section 6 discusses the social pricing counterpart. Finally, §7 offers some concluding remarks. The proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The work we present here is most closely related to, and inspired by, two quite disparate strands of research. The first is the framework advocated in Mendelson (1985) and, subsequently, extended in Mendelson and Whang (1990) ; a closely related paper is Stidham (1985) . Our basic setup in which the service system is embedded in a microeconomic framework, and the optimal pricing problem is studied as an equilibrium model, follow these papers. Although queueing per se is not explicitly present in our problem, the second stream of research that inspires our analysis is rooted in queueing theory. In their seminal paper, Halfin and Whitt (1981) present a powerful framework for analyzing queueing systems with "many" servers. Whitt (1992) discusses how scaling relations that emerge in the so-called Halfin-Whitt regime give rise to simple "rules of thumb" for the design and dimensioning of large-scale service systems (e.g., customer contact centers). Our approach blends the economic setup in Mendelson and Whang (1990) , in which the problem is phrased, with the analytical tools in Halfin and Whitt (1981) that are ultimately used to solve it.
The literature studying the use of pricing to manage the impact of externalities in congestion-sensitive systems is extensive and appears to date back to Naor (1969) ; it has since been extended and generalized in various directions by numerous authors. In terms of blending an equilibrium analysis with insights from heavy-traffic queueing theory, the recent paper by Van Mieghem (2000) is probably the most akin to ours, though the setup, objective, and use of the asymptotic analysis are different. Revenue management in the context of Internet service provision was recently studied by Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis (2000) in a Markov decision-process framework where customers are only assumed to be price sensitive. Although they focus on dynamic pricing, an important conclusion of their study is that static pricing rules can achieve near optimal performance. A similar insight was derived in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) in the "classical" context of selling a set of goods within a finite time horizon. A recent review of the revenue management literature can be found in McGill and van Ryzin (1999) .
The study of large-capacity service systems in the spirit of Halfin and Whitt (1981) is currently an active area of research. Garnett et al. (2002) study approximate design rules for large call centers, while Borst et al. (2000) consider dimensioning of call centers; the latter is related to our capacity sizing problem in §5. The flavor of the analysis in this paper is close to that in the work of Armony and Maglaras (2004) and Whitt (2004) . Both papers deal with multiserver queueing systems with congestion-sensitive demand but without economic considerations, and study the system equilibrium behavior using asymptotic methods. The relation between economics and heavy traffic has also been highlighted in a recent paper by Harrison (2003) , though the framework and asymptotic regime are both different than ours.
The model that we posit with capacity constraints and shared resources is closely related to the recent work of Das and Srikant (2000) , who analyze the performance of a congested link in a packet-switched network, also appealing to the limit theory of Halfin and Whitt (1981) . Finally, we refer to Courcoubetis et al. (2000) and Gibbens and Kelly (1999) and the references therein for an overview of Internet-related pricing literature that is tangentially related to this paper.
Problem Formulation
The System Model. External arrivals to the system, in the form of connection requests, are modelled as a homogenous Poisson process with rate . Each user has an i.i.d. service requirement, which is assumed to be exponentially distributed with known mean 1/ . Our stylized system model attempts to capture three important features of the physical system: (1) finite capacity, (2) no resource pooling when the system is underutilized, and (3) the capability to share processing resources among users. We model this as an M/M/ system with capacity constrained to C units. Specifically, let N t denote the number of users connected at time t ≥ 0; then, the processing rate experienced by the user is
Without loss of generality, we take C to be an integer corresponding to the number of nominal processing resources, assuming that such a notion is applicable. The capacity limitations play a crucial role in our modelling framework. Each nominal processing resource can be dedicated to handle a separate user request, providing service at unit rate (measured, e.g., in Kbits/second), and resources cannot be pooled when N t < C. However, when the number of connection requests exceeds the nominal capacity C, processing resources are shared in an egalitarian way among users; the system is then said to be operating in a congested state. The system dynamics are equivalent to those of an M/M/C queue, though queueing effects are absent in our conceptual formulation and quality of service is succinctly summarized in the service rate or throughput rate that is allocated to the user.
Economic Structure, User Choice Model, and System Equilibrium. We assume that the service provider charges a fixed connection fee $p > 0 when users access the system. Service degradation, due to lost throughput when the system is congested, is manifested in the form of delay experienced by the users. In communication and information services, users typically observe the rate of transmission, which indicates the degradation in service. In particular, it is reasonable (and, as we argue, not restrictive for our purposes) to assume that the rate of service serves as a proxy to assess delay in the following manner. The rate delivered to the user at time t ≥ 0 can be written as min C/N t 1 , and the user conceives delay as the inverse of the latter. Associating the nominal service level with a unit delay (i.e., the situation where a dedicated resource is allocated to the user), we define the user's conceived excess delay 2 as
We assume that a cost of $q > 0 is associated with each unit of excess delay that the user experiences. 3 Users have independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) reservation prices for the service, which are independent of the arrival process and service requirements. They join the system if their reservation price is greater or equal to the steady-state expected value of the "full price." Specifically, user valuations are denoted by v ≥ 0 and are distributed according to a probability distribution P . We will assume that the cumulative distribution function F is continuously differentiable, the density f is everywhere positive on its support, and the first moment is finite.
As previously indicated, we will focus our attention on the equilibrium steady-state behavior of the system. An equilibrium roughly corresponds to a demand 
where is the maximal potential arrival rate into the system. (The maximal potential arrival rate may also be interpreted as the effective "market size" for the applications offered by the service provider.) In particular, given the reservation price and the full cost of accessing the service, the risk-neutral user decides to join the system with probability P v ≥ p + qƐD * . In the sequel, a superscript ( * ) is used when various quantities are considered relative to the equilibrium distribution.
We note that users' knowledge of their average excess delay may be due either to repeated visits to the system in which the excess delay is observed, or alternatively, we may assume that the service provider makes this information available to the users to facilitate their decision whether to join the system or not. 5 The reader should also note that the expected excess delay (ƐD * ) depends upon the price p though this dependence will be suppressed for notational clarity. The following result establishes the intuitive fact that the system always admits a unique equilibrium.
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Proposition 1. For each capacity C > 0 and price p > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium. 4 To be precise, we say that for some price p, the system admits a unique equilibrium if there exists a unique steady-state probability distribution for the process N t t ≥ 0 , such that the expected excess delay per user when taken w.r.t. to this distribution, ƐD * , induces a time-homogenous external arrival rate * through (2) and * , in turn, is consistent with the aforementioned steady-state distribution. 5 It is more realistic to assume that state-dependent information is provided or observed by the users, however, this information structure entails a transient analysis that is more involved and will not be pursued. 6 The intuition behind this result is straightforward: for a fixed price, is strictly decreasing in the delay, while the delay ƐD is strictly increasing in and, thus, in . These observations indicate that a unique fixed point should exist. This point is the so-sought equilibrium.
The user choice model determines the nature of the demand function (the two notions are essentially equivalent). That is, the choice model defines the exogenous arrival rate into the system according to (2). The following examples illustrate how different admissible user choice models induce different demand functions. With slight abuse of notation set
if v is exponentially distributed with mean 1/ , then x = e − x ; and (3) Iso-elastic demand: if v is distributed Pareto with shape parameter > 0, then x = x − . Now, the elasticity of a demand function at a price x is given by
A demand function is said to be elastic over an interval a b if x > 1 for all x ∈ a b . The key economic assumption that we impose is the following.
Assumption 1. The demand function x is elastic over the set
For example, in the first two of the three examples of above demand functions, demand is elastic for certain values of the price x and inelastic for others; in the third model, elasticity is constant and equal to the shape parameter . Intuitively, a demand function is elastic if a decrease in price (and increase in demand) result in an increase in the revenue rate x x . In terms of the probabilistic primitives, it is equivalent to saying that xf x / F x > 1, where F · = 1 − F · . Empirical studies of the demand for bandwidth seem to support the assumption of elastic demand, for example, Lanning et al. (2000) estimated the elasticity to be around 1.4-1.5. 7 While such detailed studies are not available for many other more recently introduced information services, we expect this assumption to hold true, especially in this early stage of their adoption. For example, informal inspection of the cable modem industry seems to indicate that, at least in its initial phase, prices have been dropping while demand has been increasing in a manner that overall revenues have also been increasing.
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The Service Provider's Objective. We assume that the service provider has at her disposal the 4-tuple q P summarizing the congestion cost, the choice model and its parameters, and the service requirement. Suppose that capacity is fixed and given at C. With the price mechanism fixed, the service provider's objective is to choose the connection price (p) so as to optimize an economic objective. Specifically, we consider the goal of revenue maximization under the unique system equilibrium. (Section 6 discusses extensions to the problem of social welfare maximization.) This formulation assumes the service provider is operating in a monopolistic context. Under any pricing decision p, the system evolves as a continuous-time Markov chain. Because every user who connects to the system pays $p, and the probability of this happening in the next t time units is roughly t, we have that the revenue rate in equilibrium is
We will consider the following two formulations:
(1) Optimal pricing: Capacity of the system is fixed a priori. A price p is sought that optimizes system revenues.
(2) Joint capacity sizing and pricing: Capacity C together with a price p are sought that jointly optimize system revenues.
Both problems are considered also w.r.t. a social welfare objective in §6.
Mode of Analysis. As we have noted in the introduction, solving the aforementioned optimization problems is not straightforward. The reason is that the equilibrium framework requires us to solve the steady-state distribution of an M/M/C model, and this cannot be done in closed-form. (The distribution can only be expressed via a finite sum, where the number of terms as well as their magnitude depends on C, and the dependence on is quite complicated.) Perhaps more importantly, we believe that this mode of analysis only reveals some of the potentially interesting insights pertaining to the operation and economic value of this class of service systems. (For further discussion, see §3.3.)
The other viable option is simulation-based optimization searching for the pair * ƐD * that satisfies (2) for the given price p. This is quite cumbersome, as it involves generating a large number of sample paths to accurately estimate the steady-state quantities of interest. Furthermore, the equilibrium pairs * ƐD * must be determined for a wide range of prices to search for the optimal usage fee p. The class of systems we are attempting to model here typically has large nominal capacity, thus, the simulation-based approach tends to be computationally intensive. Just like the direct numerical approach, this method is not very revealing. Our approach will emphasize natural scaling relations resulting in "rules of thumb" that generate some insight at the expense of settling for approximate solutions. It will also illuminate an interesting connection between economic optimization and heavy-traffic limit theory, which is of interest in its own right.
Analysis of Large-Capacity Systems
This section motivates and develops an approximating model for the original system when its capacity is "large"; these approximations highlight a series of fundamental scaling relations.
Background and Underlying Assumptions
To make the forthcoming results more transparent, we first consider the "physical" modes in which the system can operate. Recall that the steady-state probability of congestion is given by congestion = D * ≥ 0 = N * ≥ C , where N * denotes the number of steady-state connections in a system with capacity C in equilibrium. Then, following Garnett et al. (2002) , we consider the following three modes of operation:
• Cost-driven regime: The system is undercapacitated, users almost always experience service degradation. In this regime, congestion ≈ 1.
• Rationalized regime: The system has balanced capacity, users experience degradation some of the times they use the system. In this regime, congestion ≈ ∈ 0 1 .
• Quality-driven regime: The system is overcapacitated, users hardly ever experience service degradation. In this regime, congestion ≈ 0.
From a purely operational standpoint, the costdriven regime will tend to underemphasize congestion effects, while the quality-driven regime will tend to stress quality of service, at the expense of overcapacitating the system. The rationalized regime may potentially offer a good compromise in terms of trading off congestion costs, capacity costs, and utilization.
The use of the probability of congestion as a proxy for quality of service is common. As it was shown in Halfin and Whitt (1981) and later argued in Whitt (1992) , this is a natural and canonical measure of the system operational characteristics. In fact, in their paper, Halfin and Whitt (1981) showed that in an M/M/C system, congestion → ∈ 0 1 as C grows large if and only if the load in the system is of the form = 1− / √ C; note that this is a statement for the rationalized regime. The parameters and are related through a one-to-one expression given later, and the system behavior basically depends on this parameter. In addition, the "natural" scales emerging when capacity is large are of order capacity. Specifically, queue lengths tend to be of that order and, as a result, the waiting times will be of order 1/ capacity (this is the time required to clear the backlogs).
These observations have important design and operation ramifications for service networks. For example, systems that strive to offer a certain level of quality of service as measured by the probability of congestion , can do so while operating at increasing utilization rates as given by 1 − / √ C as their capacity C grows larger. This demonstrates the statistical economies of scale enjoyed by large service systems and explains, for example, the high utilization rates experienced in modern-day call centers that go hand in hand with good quality of service (see, e.g., Garnett et al. 2002) . Another important manifestation of this fact is captured by the familiar square-root staffing rule that dictates that to handle a load of requests per unit time, the system should have about + √ servers (assuming = 1). The remainder of this section will characterize the asymptotic performance of our model operating in the rationalized regime, while its capacity and potential demand grow proportionally large. In particular, we will derive here an analogue of Proposition 2.1 of Halfin and Whitt (1981) that characterizes congestion in an M/M/C queue. Our analysis extends the one in Halfin and Whitt (1981) along the following directions: congestion effects are manifested through sharing rather than queueing; the arrival rate into the system is governed by rational user behavior and captured via an equilibrium analysis; and the system manager has the added capability of selecting a static price to affect demand. The key questions that will be addressed are the following: (1) How large is the congestion term given that a nontrivial fraction of all arriving users will suffer some level of congestion? (2) What is its effect on the equilibrium demand for the service? (3) What are (if any) the implications to the pricing rules that one needs to consider? Armed with these insights, §4 will show that, if one considers the objective of revenue maximization, the rationalized regime results in the optimal mode from a pure economics standpoint.
The validity and applicability of the theory we are about to expose hinges on one simple assumption: Capacity and potential demand (market size) are large. In particular, we will let the potential demand and the corresponding capacity C grow proportionally large according to C = for some appropriate > 0, while the user valuation distribution F is unaltered. 8 That is, the market potential increases, the user characteristics (valuations) stay the same, and the system size grows proportionally to to serve this larger market. Finally, in the absence of congestion effectsp defined bȳ
is the price that matches demand to capacity, i.e., P v ≥p = C .
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Main Results
We now turn to one of the main theoretical building blocks that are the key in deriving approximate solutions to the pricing and capacity sizing problems. In the sequel, we will specify results in terms of "C → " highlighting that C is a system quantity. Implicit in this statement is that is also growing such that C = .
(To recover an approximation for the behavior of a given system of interest, one should just "plug in" the appropriate values of C and into the derived expressions.) In the sequel, we make explicit the dependence of the price on the system capacity using the notation p c . Theorem 1. Assume that potential demand and the capacity C grow proportionally large such that C = for some > 0. Then, for any usage fee p C > 0 such that
it follows that (i) user demand scales as 
Hereafter, we use the notation f x = o g x if and only if f x /g x → 0 and f x ≈ g x to mean
, depending on the context and where no confusion arises. The theorem demonstrates that in the rationalized regime, the system operates "close" to full utilization according to 1− * C ≈ / √ C and congestion is low, roughly d/ √ C. The latter highlights the statistical economies of scale that such systems enjoy, and the fact that the associated congestion becomes a secondorder phenomenon. This specifies the appropriate regime for asymptotic analysis. In addition, the price control must admit the decomposition p ≈p + / √ C, wherep is explicitly identified in terms of exogenous problem parameters ( ) and the capacity (C). Note that due to the assumption that potential demand and capacity scale proportionally,p is, indeed, a constant independent of the system size. This implies that the pricing problems reduce to selecting the optimal value of that will optimally balance the lost revenues with the congestion costs.
Discussion. We turn to several comments on the content of the theorem, and the various quantities appearing there.
(1) Converse Implications. The theorem is in fact an if and only if result. That is, the assumption that the probability of congestion has a nondegenerate limit and each of the conditions (i)-(iii) are all equivalent. We do not spell this out, however, the proof of the theorem should suggest why this is true.
(2) Parameter Relations. The second-order parameters d are all uniquely determined by , the limiting congestion probability. For our purposes, it will be more useful to consider as the free variable. In fact, because our study focuses on pricing objectives and price is the intrinsic design variable, secondorder "congestion-related effects" d should really be considered subordinate to . We will pursue the analysis assuming that this shift in focus has been made. To explain the nature of the infinitesimal parameters, first note that is the limit of N * ≥ C as C → , and is given explicitly in (2.3) of Halfin and Whitt (1981) :
where x and x denote the density and cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. Note that ∈ 0 1 implies that 0 < < . Given the one-to-one relationship in (6), henceforth, we will omit further reference to and focus attention on . The following gives relations between , d, and (see the Appendix for details):
The expression for d can be easily derived by noting that d = lim C→ √ CƐD * . Plugging in the expression for the expected excess delay given in (9), namely,
and → 1 as C → , we get the stated relation using the expression for given in (6). It remains to establish the uniqueness of (its unique value was denoted by * in the statement of the theorem). This is resolved in the next proposition, where (8) follows from (7). 
(3) System Equilibrium Calculations. Note that the system equilibrium is now characterized via the second-order arrival rate * , which, in turn, can be obtained through a simple numerical computation. As previously discussed, * is the key quantity that is used to derive approximations for the equilibrium demand rate * ≈ C − * √ C , and the equilibrium congestion cost qƐD * ≈ qd * / √ C. These simple "rules of thumb" will facilitate the analysis of the optimization problems stated in §2, thus, allowing us to circumvent the difficulties involved in direct calculations of the equilibrium or a simulation-based approach.
Comments on Exact Analysis and
Complete Resource Pooling Exact Analysis. As mentioned in § §1 and 2, one can also undertake an exact analysis of the M/M/C model. To illustrate the main ideas of this approach and contrast it with the approximate analysis pursued above, consider the profit maximization objective described in (3). Given the definition of the excess delay, D = N /C − 1 + , a straightforward calculation that follows from §1 in Halfin and Whitt (1981) yields that when the traffic intensity = * /C < 1, the steady-state congestion term is given by
where C = N * ≥ C is the probability that an arriving user finds the system in the congested state, explicitly given in Equation (1.2) of Halfin and Whitt (1981) . Taking derivatives with respect to the price $p at the equilibrium point in (3), the first-order condition is given by
where we have made explicit the dependence of the delay on the price p. After lengthy, yet straightforward calculations, this can be reduced to
To solve this equation, one needs to first be able to evaluate what is the equilibrium for each choice of $p, and then find the unique optimizer p rm . Although this approach seems obvious, it is not straightforward to pursue. In §4, we undertake this analysis using the large-capacity asymptotics that were discussed above. This approach is revealing in several regards.
An Alternative Model with Complete Resource
Pooling. We briefly discuss an alternative mode of analysis in which resources may be pooled not only when the system is congested. That is, unlike the model formulated in this paper, this alternative system always devotes its full capacity (C) to process
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user service requirements. The underlying Markov chain in this case is identical to that of an M/M/1 system, where the server works at rate C instead of unit rate. Our interest, as before, is focused on largecapacity systems with high traffic flows. Therefore, we assume that the demand rate scales as C = C, while the average service requirement is, as before, held fixed at 1/ .
Let W denote the total time a user spends in the system in steady-state. Then, for an M/M/1 system, Little's law yields that ƐW = 1/ C − C . Now, if we fix the utilization = / , then the expected time in the system decays like 1/C as C grows large. In the so-called rationalized regime, i.e., where the arrival rate scales like C = C − √ C as C grows large, the expected time in the system will scale like 1/ √ C. These scaling relations are consistent with the ones present in an M/M/C system: if < 1, then the congestion experienced due to resource sharing decays as 1/C as C grows large; if the system is assumed to operate in the rationalized regime, the congestion scales like 1/ √ C. Because the congestion delay seems to drive the user-choice dynamics, it would appear that the simpler M/M/1 model should give rise to the same insights derived on the basis of the M/M/C model (that does not support complete resource pooling). A closer inspection, however, reveals that the two models are actually quite different.
In the sequel, we focus on the rationalized regime (the following section will establish its economic optimality). The key step is to parse the expected time in the system ƐW into two components: the actual service time and the excess delay. Then, for the M/M/1 model, the congestion cost is of order 1/ √ C, while the service time is of order 1/C , and the total number of jobs in the system is of order √ C. In sharp contrast, in the M/M/C system, the congestion term is of order 1/ √ C, while the time in service is of order 1/ , and the total number of jobs in the system is roughly C, plus or minus fluctuations of order √ C. Thus, the models give rise to fundamentally different dynamics along the following two components: (1) the number of users in the system, and (2) the relative time scales in the system. In particular, in the M/M/1 system, congestion (≈1/ √ C) actual time in service (≈1/C ). In contrast, in the M/M/C system, congestion (≈1/ √ C) actual time in service (≈1/ ). The above differences have an immediate bearing on economic analysis. To this end, note that the probability of a user joining the system is v ≥ p + q × congestion . While this expression does not include the time in service, this is implicitly assumed to be accounted for in the valuation v. In other words, one could rewrite the choice probability as v ≥ p C + q/ + q × congestion , while in the M/M/1 system, the corresponding choice probability would be v ≥ p 1 + q/C + q × congestion . Because the congestion terms are of order 1/ √ C in both cases and joining the system ≈ C , it must be that p C + q/ ≈ p 1 + q/C . As C grows large, the first-order price term in the M/M/1 model, denoted byp 1 , will be such thatp 1 =p + q/ . In particular, this implies that the economic decisions extracted on the basis of the two models will significantly differ, emphasizing the need to carefully match the "right" model to the application of interest. (We note in passing that systems that motivate the study in this paper are probably not adequately modeled using the complete resource pooling assumption.)
Revenue Maximization
The previous section established that the rationalized regime is a reasonable and appealing mode of operation for large-capacity systems, insofar as it balances quality and efficiency considerations. This section builds on this observation and blends it into the economic objective of the system manager, namely, revenue maximization. To that end, the main result of the section asserts that under the assumption that demand is elastic, the rationalized regime is the optimal mode to operate the system from purely economic considerations. Consequently, the insights of Theorem 1 can be applied toward solving the pricing problem.
Economic Optimality of the Rationalized Regime. First, we show that as capacity grows, revenue maximization implies that the system approaches the heavy-traffic regime. Second, we show that revenue maximization implies the price decomposition asserted in Theorem 1 and, consequently, the rationalized regime is economically optimal. The main assumption underlying our analysis is that capacity is "scarce," and this is spelled out by assuming that demand is elastic (i.e., > 1) in the feasible range ∈ 0 C . Informally, the elasticity assumption implies that the service provider is always "better off" (as measured by her monopolistic objective) inducing a higher equilibrium arrival rate. That is, in the absence of congestion costs, she should set a price that induces the maximum arrival rate sustainable by the system, given by C . This, of course, puts the system in heavy traffic and results in significant congestion costs, thus, reducing the equilibrium arrival rate. The relevant question is: By how much?
Extending the revenue rate definition in (3), we set, for each C > 0, R p C = p P v ≥ p + qƐD * , and denote the optimal price p rm C ∈ arg max p R p C . The associated equilibrium traffic intensity is denoted by rm C , making the dependence of these quantities on C explicit (in the sequel, this may be omitted when no confusion arises). The following proposition asserts that under demand elasticity, profit maximization implies that large-capacity systems operate in heavy traffic. The intuition behind this result is fairly straightforward. First, Theorem 1 has already established that as the system approaches heavy traffic along the "rationalized" regime ( C ≈ 1 − / √ C), congestion costs behave like O 1/ √ C and become negligible. While this does not imply that the system manager would choose to operate the system in this regime, it does simultaneously establish the feasibility of sustaining high utilization and good quality of service. The demand elasticity implies that if congestion is negligible, the service provider will price to induce a high rate of demand, because this results in increased revenues. (In a recent paper, Harrison (2003) considers an example of a queueing system that is driven by its economic and physical structure to operate in heavy traffic; the setup and analysis there are quite different from the one we pursue here).
Proposition 3 suggests that the optimal price ought to be close top, which is the static price that "places" the system in heavy traffic. It says nothing, however, about the actual structure of the optimal price, the associated level of congestion, how close the system is to the heavy-traffic regime, and what the revenues realized by the optimized system are. Theorem 2 addresses all of these questions.
Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and assume, in addition, that capacity scales proportionally to potential demand. Then, for large C, the optimal price is given by
wherep is the price that places the system in heavy traffic given in (4), and rm is the defined via the following optimization problem:
where * is defined for each ∈ as the unique solution of (8).
Given (10) the first-order condition that characterizes the revenue maximizing price is
This equation is used to define the optimal secondorder social price rm , taking as given the definition ofp (the heavy-traffic-inducing price), and the notion of the equilibrium * . Discussion and Ramifications. One key insight that follows from Proposition 3 and Theorem 2 is that economically optimized systems with large capacity, shared resources, and elastic demand operate under high nominal resource utilization rates, i.e., they give rise to heavy traffic as the nominal operating point. It is important to note that although the statement of Theorem 2 resembles Theorem 1, it is not derived from it. However, the converse implications of Theorem 1 (see Remark 1) establish that the structure of the optimal price in itself implies that the system operates in the rationalized regime. Consequently, the equilibrium traffic intensity is given by
satisfies (8), or equivalently, the equilibrium demand is given by C − rm √ C + o √ C . These expressions describe the precise way by which the system should approach heavy traffic to optimally balance revenues with congestion costs. Moreover, the mode of operation for the optimized system is such that the probability of congestion is moderate, i.e., congestion is not completely avoided, nor is it the standard fare.
Theorem 2 specifies the form of the optimal price, and a simple numerical optimization routine computes it to within high accuracy. Specifically, this theorem asserts that we can restrict attention to the rationalized regime, and to pricing rules of the form p =p + / √ C. Let us first give some intuition pertaining to the derivation of the optimal price. Using the scaling relations of Theorem 1, the revenue rate can be expressed as
where the first equality is a restatement of Theorem 1, Parts (i) and (ii). Hence, as capacity grows large, the problem of selecting the optimal static price to maximize revenues reduces to the problem of choosing ∈ to minimize the second-order term of lost revenues above, which is exactly (10) in the statement of the proposition. The trade-off in (10) is evident: as increases, we have that * p decreases and, thus, * increases (as a consequence of Theorem 1). Revenue maximization essentially reduces to a secondorder analysis that answers the following question: How far from heavy traffic should the system be to optimally balance lost revenues and congestion costs?
Algorithmically, we can compute the optimal price as follows. Taking as input the endogenous variable, i.e., fixed capacity (C), and the exogenous parameters of the problem, viz, potential demand ( ), user choice model (F ), and user mean service requirement (1/ ), we proceed as follows. First, set the parameterp that appears in the limit problem in terms of original problem data as in (4) , where = C / . Second, compute the equilibrium * using (8) for each in a fine grid. Finally, evaluatep * − for each value of in the grid, and seek the minimum value. The system revenues can be computed using the expansions for R p C given above.
The closed-form expressions derived thus far can be used to analytically or numerically check the sensitivity of various performance quantities with respect to the congestion parameter q (as well as other model parameters). The key insights derived from this sensitivity analysis are (1) first-order effects, in general, and the heavy-traffic pricep, in particular, are independent of q; (2) for fixed price, the equilibrium arrival rate and the associated revenue rate are decreasing in q; (3) the revenue maximizing price is increasing in q; and (4) the equilibrium demand at the revenue maximizing price, the associated congestion cost, and the resulting revenues are decreasing in q.
Numerical Results. We now turn to some numerical results that illustrate the accuracy of the proposed approximations. We consider a system with capacity C, potential demand = 2 5 · C (connection requests per minute), = 1, and a linear demand model with = 1 · C. User sensitivity to congestion is described via the cost q = $1 per unit of lost throughput (per user). Figure 1 depicts three graphs: revenue, price, and congestion cost as a function of capacity. Each graph has two plots: one describing results for the simulation-based optimization and the other depicting the results obtained via the proposed approximations. Two things, essentially one of the same, stand out on close inspection.
First, we observe that the approximation is quite accurate across a range of system sizes. In particular, the optimal price p, which was derived via exhaustive simulation-based optimization has the predicted behavior of p ≈p + / √ C, wherep = 1 5 for this problem data. To reiterate this point, the simulation-based optimization did not assume this structure, rather, it emerges as a consequence of the profit maximization objective. The exhaustive search for the optimum is tedious given the necessity to seek equilibrium pairs * p qƐD * p that satisfy (2). The accuracy of the simple approximation derived from Theorem 2 completely alleviates this computational effort. The second interesting point is not explicitly depicted in the graphs, though it can be inferred in an obvious manner: the "optimized" system operates in "heavy traffic." In fact, it is easy to see that the utilization behaves like 1
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− * C ≈ O 1/ √ C .
Joint Capacity Sizing and Pricing
So far, capacity (C) was taken to be exogenously fixed, or the outcome of some a priori optimization. We now consider the problem of jointly choosing the system capacity and the price to maximize profits. Inputs to this design problem are the model parameters summarized by the 4-tuple q P and the cost of capacity (appropriately amortized over time), which is assumed to be linear and given by $w per unit of capacity. That is, we are assuming that there are no economies of scale in the cost structure (in practice, this is typically attributed to increased system complexity).
The monopolistic service provider is faced with the following profit maximization problem:
Let us denote by C rm and p rm the corresponding maximizers (not necessarily unique). To ensure the service provider can always extract some positive profit by operating such a set of resources, we assume that P v > w = F w > 0. Once again, exact solutions are difficult to derive in the absence of a simple characterization of the equilibrium behavior. Our approach targets approximate solutions, and builds on the foundations developed in § §3 and 4. The key result was obtained in Theorem 2, where it was shown that for elastic demand ( > 1) and any choice of capacity C, the revenue maximizing price places the system in the rationalized regime, where congestion costs per
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user are of order 1/ √ C, equilibrium demand is * = C − * √ C , and the optimal price is of the form p = p + / √ C. The same result holds true when C is a decision variable, provided that the demand elasticity is still valid. Specifically, for any value of capacity C (including the optimal choice C rm ), the revenue maximizing price places the system in the rationalized regime, where
Substituting the above into the profit maximization problem (12), we arrive at the following approximate formulation:
For large systems, the two terms are essentially decoupled suggesting the following heuristic.
(i) Capacity Sizing: Choose the capacity C rm that maximizes the nominal profit rate assuming that the system will operate in heavy traffic and neglecting any stochastic effects. This fixes the first-order price termp rm =p C rm that places the system in heavy traffic.
(ii) Pricing: Given the optimal choice for capacity C rm , choose the second-order price componentˆ rm to minimize the performance degradation due to congestion.
A solution C rm to the capacity sizing problem will serve to approximate C rm , the optimal capacity decision, whilep rm =p rm +ˆ rm / C rm will approximate the optimal price p rm . A more explicit characterization of the approximate solution (given by the decoupling heuristic) can be obtained if we are willing to assume a first-order optimality condition for the optimization problem (i). For example, problem (i) is concave in the design variable C for all three demand models mentioned in §2. The unique solution satisfies C rm in 0 ˜ / , which implies that the increasing costs of capacity force the optimized system to operate in a region where the demand is elastic. The first-order condition for an optimizer is
, where = C / , thus, (13) can be rewritten as
Under the aforementioned concavity assumption, this equation has a unique solution denoted byˆ , which determines the optimal capacity as a fraction of the potential demand, i.e., C rm =ˆ . Because P v > w > 0, it is easy to deduce thatˆ ∈ 0 1 . Givenˆ , problem (ii) can be used to select the second-order price correction termˆ rm = arg min F −1 ˆ − ∈ . This is also uniquely determined byˆ . In summary, the proposed solution is to set
whereˆ is determined by (13 
10 Previous asymptotic results were phrased in terms of C growing large. Given that C is now a decision variable, the natural proxy for system size is the potential demand , which reflects the market size.
Given that the profit rate is of the form
the asymptotic optimality result asserts that the proposed heuristic correctly matches the first-order profit term of the optimally designed system. This implies that asymptotically the optimal level of capacity is "close" toˆ and that the optimal price is close tô p rm .
11
Finally, the following numerical example depicted in Figure 2 illustrates the accuracy of this approximate solution. The results are derived for a linear demand model with = 200 connection requests/min, = 50, q = 1, = 1 per min, and w = $1. For the linear demand model,
The capacity sizing problem becomes
The corresponding optimizer is given by
Also,p
Optimizing over the second-order term in the way outlined above givesp rm = $2 604. In contrast, the optimal capacity level and price obtained via exhaustive simulation was C rm = 79 and p rm = $2 529. The differences are, indeed, small (and asymptotically negligible).
The use of a second-order "correction" to control the congestion costs also appears in Borst et al. (2000) , where this is achieved by adjusting the system's capacity. In contrast to our work, they do not model the choice behavior (demand is fixed) and there is no pricing or equilibrium analysis. To recapitulate, the key insight that emerges is that the capacity 11 The same approach may still be applicable under more general cost structures, e.g., Theorem 3 can be extended to the case of linear demand and quadratic cost of capacity. The key requirement is that capacity costs do not dominate revenues as capacity grows large.
sizing and pricing problems decouple and both can be easily solved. Capacity is selected to maximize profits to first order, while pricing is selected to optimally balance revenues with congestion costs; the optimally sized and priced system operates in heavy traffic.
Social Welfare Optimization
We now turn to a brief discussion of large-capacity systems that operate under a social welfare objective. Because the main results, as well as their derivation, are essentially mirroring the approach taken in the previous section, we will focus here only on a sketch of the main ideas.
Social Welfare Maximization (Social Pricing). This formulation assumes that the system is to be operated with the objective of maximizing the total utility. In equilibrium, the total expected cost per connection is given by p + qƐD * . Define
to be the total value generated per unit time for all subscribers that select to join the system. The systemwide value created per unit time is
and the service provider's objective is to choose the price p to maximize the systemwide value.
We proceed using standard arguments to characterize the socially optimal price (see Mendelson and Whang 1990) . It is convenient to consider V · and U · as functions of the rate variable , rather than the price p (with slight abuse of notation). The optimal pricing problem will then be phrased in terms of choosing the optimal equilibrium demand rate * , which, in turn, will uniquely define the socially optimal price p. Differentiating U with respect to , and evaluating the derivative at the point * (let us denote this as U * for simplicity) gives the following firstorder condition: From * = F p + qƐD * , it follows that the utility of the marginal user who joins the system when the equilibrium demand rate is * is V * = p + qƐD * = F −1 * / . Substituting this in the above expression gives the socially optimal price, p
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That is, it is socially optimal to charge each user the externality (or congestion) cost that he imposes on the system. Exact evaluation of the socially optimal price is, again, complicated due to the equilibrium formulation and, thus, relies on exhaustive simulation or numerical approximation of the steady-state equilibrium probabilities. As we show next, the corresponding asymptotic characterization is much simpler to work with, and the task of social optimization is computationally trivial.
An argument similar to that of §4 shows that maximizing social welfare will also "drive" the system to operate in the rationalized regime. Counterparts to Proposition 3 and Theorem 2 can be derived under the same modelling assumptions with one change: here, we do not require demand elasticity.
12 Using the scaling relations derived in Theorem 1, we can derive the appropriate social optimization objective for the asymptotic system, and proceed with the secondorder analysis to approximate the optimal price. In the following derivation, we will use the fact that
. Starting from (16), we can write
In the absence of congestion costs, the social value function U · becomes U p = p vf v dv, which is decreasing in p. That is, as we lower price and p increases, the systemwide value increases. This characteristic of the social value function is essentially the equivalent of the elasticity assumption and will drive the economically optimized system to heavy traffic.
Because = f p / F p + qd * , asymptotically the social optimization problem reduces to choosing the second-order price term to min ∈ p * + qd * * , making the dependence on * and explicit. Recall also that d = / . This is readily solvable given the characterization of the equilibrium * in (8). Taking derivatives with respect to , the first-order optimality condition is given by / * p * + qd * = 0, which implies that
Note the similarity between (19) and (11) derived under the revenue maximization objective.
Discussion. Expression (19) is closely related to (17), and has a natural interpretation. Recall that the optimal pricing rule is of the form p =p + / √ C, thus, for large-capacity systems, each subscriber pays p. The right-hand side of (19) is the externality cost, where the negative sign accounts for the fact that as * increases, the arrival rate into the system decreases. Hence, the socially optimal equilibrium corresponds to the operating point soc , where the externality cost −q d * / * equals the first-order pricep paid by the users. Parenthetically, it follows from (11) that under revenue maximization, the service provider charges a fixed premium over the externality cost. Moreover, using (19) 
Moreover, one can show that asymptotically as the market size grows large, this implies that the actual optimal capacity and price decisions will also be ordered in the same way, i.e., C soc > C rm and p soc < p rm . That is, the socially optimal solution will have higher capacity and charge less than the revenue maximizing one, which is consistent with similar comparisons made in the context of various other systems dating back to the seminal paper by Naor (1969) .
Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the proliferation of communication and information services, this paper introduces and analyzes a model for systems with large capacity, and resources that can be shared among users when the system is congested but cannot be pooled when the system is underutilized. Such systems exhibit statistical economies of scale in the sense that they
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become more "efficient" as their capacity increases. A tractable asymptotic analysis leads to several structural insights.
(i) Operating Regime: The system should operate close to "heavy traffic," where nominally all resources are fully utilized. This is optimal in the context of revenue maximization (under the assumption that demand is elastic), and under a social optimization objective.
(ii) Pricing: The optimal price admits a simple decomposition; the service provider computes a price to bring the system to "heavy traffic" and, subsequently, applies a second-order correction term that depends on the size of the system to optimally balance congestion effects.
(iii) Joint Capacity and Pricing Decisions: Given the natural scaling relationships intrinsic to such systems, the capacity sizing and pricing problems decouple. Capacity is chosen to maximize profits (or total system value) assuming that the system is fully utilized and neglecting stochastic variability. The price is then adjusted to optimally balance congestion costs.
Several interesting directions of future research arise. One natural extension concerns a system that supports differentiated services. In the information and communication service context, in particular, for systems that share resources, the natural first step is to consider a menu with two service grades: "guaranteed" and "best effort." The former refers to users that are guaranteed a constant rate of service irrespective of the state of the system, while the latter refers to users that share the remaining capacity (and, thus, are prone to service degradation). To this end, the HalfinWhitt (1981) many-server asymptotic regime supports certain diffusion approximations that can be used to facilitate the study differentiated services (some preliminary results along these lines are derived in Maglaras and Zeevi 2002) .
While this paper has focused on steady-state analysis, the diffusion approximations that were pioneered by Halfin and Whitt (1981) could be used to approximate transient behavior in such systems, adding another important layer to the current static analysis. Finally, an even more challenging problem concerns the dynamic pricing mechanism that extends the static fixed-price setting considered herein. In particular, the results in the current paper strongly suggest that this would revolve around second-order analysis as well. ≥ 0 and define = C / . We will prove that →ˆ ∈ 0 1 as → , wherê is defined via C =ˆ / , the unique root of (13). It then follows that the decoupled heuristic of (14) is asymptotically optimal.
To shorten notation, the superscript "rm" will be dropped in the sequel. First, recall thatˆ ∈ 0 1 and that C / =ˆ for all . Also, note thatp C = F −1 ˆ =p ˆ . It is easy to show that under the proposed heuristic Becauseˆ is assumed to be the unique optimizer of the capacity sizing problem, i.e., it is uniquely defined via (13), it follows that p − w ≤ˆ p ˆ − wˆ with equality achieved only when =ˆ . To establish that =ˆ , we need to ensure that this asymptotic profit rate is achieved by the optimal
